John Whitmire Found His Next Excuse: The City Attorney Says It’s Illegal

On November 4, I asked whether Houston Mayor John Whitmire would find another excuse to avoid changing HPD’s cooperation with ICE once Greg Abbott’s political pressure began disappearing. We now have an answer. The mayor has changed the policy, but when three council members tried to make that change permanent, City Attorney Arturo Michel declared their proposed ordinance unlawful.

We now have the answer: yes, he will continue to hide. Remember, Whitmire was one of Dan Patrick’s sheep.

The irony is difficult to ignore. On November 6, Whitmire issued an executive order restricting when Houston police officers could contact Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Council Members Alejandra Salinas, Edward Pollard and Tiffany Thomas subsequently proposed an ordinance incorporating essentially the same restrictions.

According to the Houston Chronicle’s November 18 report, Michel determined that the ordinance violated Texas law and intruded upon the mayor’s administrative authority. Consequently, the council members were prevented from bringing their proposal to a vote.

An attorney’s opinion does not become the law merely because the attorney says it is.

I practiced law for many years. I understand that competent attorneys frequently disagree about what a statute means, how it applies, and whether a particular government action is lawful. Those disagreements are settled through legal analysis and, when necessary, litigation. They are not conclusively settled by the opinion of one attorney, even if that attorney works for the City of Houston.

Michel has identified two concerns: Texas Senate Bill 4, which restricts local governments from limiting cooperation with federal immigration authorities, and Houston’s division of legislative and administrative authority.

Both deserve serious consideration. Neither should be accepted without examining how the law applies to the actual language of the proposed ordinance.

If Whitmire can issue an executive order restricting HPD’s cooperation with ICE, why can’t City Council adopt legislation containing substantially the same restrictions?

There may be a legitimate legal distinction. The mayor has administrative authority over the police department, while City Council exercises legislative powers. But that distinction must be explained and supported by law. It cannot simply be invoked to end the discussion.

The proposed ordinance also included additional reporting requirements, which may raise separate questions. That makes examining its actual text even more important.

The council members submitted their proposal through Proposition A, approved by Houston voters in 2023 to give three council members the ability to place lawful matters on the council agenda. Michel’s decision now raises another question: how much practical authority do elected council members have if the legal department can prevent their proposals from reaching the council chamber?

The mayor also has considerable power over the city attorney himself.

Houston Code of Ordinances Section 2-257 permits the mayor to remove the city attorney at any time. Michel originally returned to the position under Mayor Sylvester Turner, but Whitmire retained him upon taking office.

I knew Michel years ago through his work involving public educational institutions, including HISD and HCC. I regarded him as a good attorney. This is not about questioning his intelligence or professional qualifications. It is about the independence of legal advice when the attorney’s continued employment depends upon the mayor.

I also remember how these relationships worked during the administration of Mayor Bob Lanier.

I served as chief of staff to Council Member Felix Fraga and knew City Attorney Benjamin Hall personally. I considered Hall one of the smartest people I had ever met.

When Hall announced his departure in 1994, I asked him about it because I thought he was doing an excellent job for Houston. As I recall our conversation, Hall described a disagreement with Lanier over whether something the mayor wanted was lawful. I remember his successor taking a different position, although I cannot now identify the specific matter. That is my recollection of what Hall told me, not a verified explanation for his resignation.

The experience taught me why we should examine a city attorney’s legal conclusions rather than assume that the position itself makes those conclusions correct.

Now there is another development, one that may tell us more about Whitmire’s strategy than the legal department’s rejection of the ordinance.

Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton has renewed his lawsuit challenging Whitmire’s November 6 executive order. His office filed a motion for summary judgment in Fort Bend County, contending that the order violates SB 4.

But Paxton leaves office in January 2027, when Democrat Nathan Johnson becomes attorney general.

As reported in coverage of the lawsuit, Michel has publicly suggested that Paxton may have difficulty obtaining a ruling before the new administration takes office. Whitmire has likewise pointed to the change in state leadership as a reason to wait.

I suspect the city’s strategy may be to defend the lawsuit long enough for Paxton to leave office, hoping that his successor will decline to continue the litigation.

That is my interpretation, not proof that the city intends to file unnecessary motions or deliberately obstruct the proceedings. Litigation takes time, and defending a lawsuit through ordinary court procedures is entirely legitimate.

But the timing is impossible to overlook. Paxton has only weeks remaining in office. The incoming attorney general has indicated a different approach to enforcing SB 4. A lawsuit that remains unresolved in January could take a substantially different course under new leadership.

There is nothing inherently unlawful about taking a change in government into account when making litigation decisions. But Houstonians are entitled to ask whether the mayor is relying on that political transition instead of securing a lasting city policy.

And even if the incoming attorney general dismisses the lawsuit, that would not automatically establish that Whitmire’s executive order complies with state law. The statute would remain in effect unless changed by the Legislature or affected by a controlling court decision.

That brings us back to the fundamental difference between Whitmire’s executive order and the proposed ordinance.

An executive order can be changed or withdrawn by the mayor who issued it. An ordinance provides a more durable legislative framework, ordinarily requiring another legislative action to repeal or amend it.

The council members want the restrictions on HPD’s cooperation with ICE to survive beyond the preferences of one mayor. Whitmire has decided that his executive order is sufficient.

Those are materially different positions concerning the future of Houston’s policy.

In April, Whitmire warned about the potential loss of approximately $114 million in state funding after City Council attempted to restrict HPD’s cooperation with ICE. Now the governor who applied that pressure is leaving office, and the mayor has issued restrictions of his own.

Yet when elected council members seek to make those restrictions permanent, they encounter another legal obstacle.

The mayor’s position may have a defensible legal basis. But the public deserves a clear explanation rather than being told that the city attorney has spoken and the matter is closed.

There is also a straightforward way to clarify the controversy. Publish Michel’s complete legal reasoning, identify the precise provisions of SB 4 allegedly violated, explain the difference between executive and legislative authority, and permit the public to evaluate the conclusions.

On November 4, I asked where John Whitmire would hide once Greg Abbott could no longer serve as his excuse.

The answer may not be quite what I anticipated. Whitmire has changed the policy, but he has not agreed to make it permanent. His legal department has blocked the council members’ attempt to do so, while the mayor looks toward a new attorney general who may end the state’s lawsuit.

Whether this reflects legitimate legal caution, a political calculation, or some combination of the two remains an open question.

What is not in question is that Michel’s legal opinion is not a court judgment, and the prospect of Paxton leaving office does not resolve the underlying legal issue.

Houston deserves more than a policy that depends upon who occupies the governor’s mansion, who serves as attorney general, or who happens to be mayor.

That is the question Whitmire still needs to answer.

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